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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Yoselin Linet Martinez Cazun, a native and citizen of 
Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in 2014. She 
was detained and removed under an expedited removal order. 
Later that year, she attempted to re-enter the United States, 
was detained again, and her previous removal order was 
reinstated. When she attempted to apply for asylum, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) held that she was 
statutorily ineligible to apply because her previous order of 
removal had been reinstated. Cazun appeals that ruling. 
 
 This case thus presents a question that many of our 
sister circuits have already answered in the negative: may an 
alien subject to a reinstated removal order apply for asylum? 
Because we find that Congress has not spoken clearly on the 
issue in the relevant statute, we will give Chevron deference 
to the agency’s reasonable statutory interpretation that aliens 




 A. Factual Background 
 In March 2014, Cazun fled her native Guatemala 
following threats against her life by unknown persons. Upon 
arrival in the United States, Cazun was detained by 
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immigration authorities. Because Cazun expressed a fear of 
returning to Guatemala, an asylum officer interviewed her. 
The asylum officer made a negative credible fear 
determination, and an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) affirmed that 
decision. Thus, an expedited order of removal was issued to 
Cazun, and she returned to Guatemala.  
 
 Upon Cazun’s return to Guatemala, her circumstances 
grew more dire. The head of a drug trafficking gang 
threatened, tortured, and sexually assaulted her.1 To escape, 
Cazun fled again to the United States, this time with her two-
year-old son. On her attempted re-entry, Cazun was detained 
by Border Patrol.  
 
 After determining that Cazun had already been 
removed from the United States once before, the Department 
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) notified Cazun that it 
intended to reinstate her previously entered removal order. 
Through this reinstatement process, the DHS would simply 
re-execute her previous removal order and deport her rather 
than initiating an entirely new removal process. But before 
deportation, Cazun expressed fear of returning to Guatemala, 
so she was interviewed by an asylum officer.2 The asylum 
                                              
1  The drug trafficker apparently targeted Cazun because 
of a debt owed him by the father of Cazun’s child. Cazun was 
not married to the father of her child, but she lived with him.  
2  Although an asylum officer conducted the interview, 
the only purpose of the interview was to determine Cazun’s 
eligibility for withholding of removal and protection under 




officer made a negative reasonable fear determination, and an 
IJ affirmed that decision. 
 
 Subsequently, but still before deportation, Cazun 
consulted counsel and urged that she had been unable to 
reveal the full details of her suffering in her previous 
interview due to the psychological trauma she had endured in 
Guatemala. Consequently, she obtained a new interview with 
an asylum officer. At this interview, Cazun described being 
sexually assaulted, tortured, and facing threats against her life 
and the life of her son. The asylum officer concluded that 
Cazun’s testimony was credible and that it established a 
reasonable fear of persecution. But because Cazun’s previous 
removal order had been reinstated, she was placed in hearings 
before an IJ to determine her eligibility for withholding of 
removal and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection 
only.  
 
 The IJ granted Cazun withholding of removal and 
protection under the regulations implementing obligations 
under the CAT, but would not consider Cazun’s asylum 
request.3 He stated that under current statutes and regulations, 
                                              
3  Aliens may prefer to seek asylum rather than 
withholding of removal or CAT protection for several 
reasons. First, unlike other forms of relief, asylum provides a 
pathway to lawful permanent resident status and, ultimately, 
citizenship. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 
n.6 (1987). Second, withholding of removal and CAT 
protection only prevent removal of an alien to the specific 
country from which she fled; asylum prevents removal from 
the United States altogether. See id. Third, withholding of 
removal status comes with several restrictions, including 
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Cazun was ineligible to apply for asylum due to her reinstated 
removal order.4  
 
 Cazun appealed to the BIA, which agreed with the IJ 
that Cazun was ineligible for asylum. The BIA based its 
decision on 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), which states that aliens 
like Cazun who are subject to a reinstated removal order are 
“not eligible and may not apply for any relief under [8 U.S.C. 
Ch. 12].” A.R. 3.  The BIA further cited applicable 
regulations of the Attorney General that allow “an alien 
fearing persecution to apply for withholding of removal only.” 
A.R. 3. (emphasis added) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.31(e), 
1208.31(g)(2); 1241.8(e)). Cazun timely appealed the BIA’s 
ruling to this Court, urging that she is eligible for asylum 
pursuant to the asylum provision, and it should apply 
notwithstanding her reinstated removal order.  
 
 
                                                                                                     
potential limitations on the ability to work and travel 
internationally. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(10); 8 C.F.R. § 241.7.   
 Finally, the standard for asserting a successful asylum 
claim is less demanding than the standard for withholding of 
removal or CAT protection. Compare Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. at 430–32 (“well-founded fear” standard applies to 
asylum applications), with 8. C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(iii) 
(applicant for withholding of removal must prove she “more 
likely than not” will suffer harm if returned to native 
country), and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (applicant for CAT 
protection must establish she “more likely than not” would be 
tortured if returned to native country).  
4  Cazun’s young son, who was not subject to a 
reinstated removal order, was granted asylum.  
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 B. Statutory Background 
 The issue presented by Cazun’s appeal arises from two 
separate but related statutes: 8 U.S.C. § 1158, the asylum 
statute, and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), the reinstatement bar.5  
 
  i. Asylum Statute  
 The initial version of § 1158 was enacted by the 
Refugee Act of 1980, affording “an alien” the right to apply 
for asylum “irrespective of immigration status.” See Refugee 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208 (codified as amended 
at § 1158). “The purpose of the [Act] . . . was ‘to provide a 
permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this 
country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the 
United States.’” Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 198 (3d Cir. 
1996) (quoting Pub. L. No. 96-212, tit. I, § 101(b), 94 Stat. 
102 (1980)). 
 
 In 1996, Congress altered the statutory scheme,6 
enacting the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 
110 Stat. 3009. IIRIRA preserved and in many ways 
replicated the initial version of § 1158. In its updated form, § 
1158(a)(1) instructed that  “[a]ny alien who is physically 
                                              
5  For ease of reference, unless otherwise noted, statutory 
sections referenced in the remainder of this opinion come 
from Title 8 of the United States Code.  
6  Congress had previously amended the statute in 1990 
to forbid individuals convicted of aggravated felonies from 
being granted asylum. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-649, § 515. 
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present in the United States . . .  irrespective of such alien’s 
status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section.”  
 
 Despite this seemingly broad guarantee, Congress 
carved out exceptions for several classes of aliens making 
them statutorily ineligible to apply for asylum: those who 
could be safely resettled into another country, see § 
1158(a)(2)(A), those who failed to timely apply, see § 
1158(a)(2)(B), and those previously denied asylum, see § 
1158(a)(2)(C). However, even in the face of these exceptions, 
§ 1158(a)(2)(D) created an exception to the exceptions: 
despite a previous denial of asylum or tardy asylum 
application, an alien could apply if she could demonstrate 
“changed circumstances which materially affect [her] 
eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating 
to the delay in filing an application.”  
 
  ii. Reinstatement 
 IIRIRA also altered the effect of a previously entered 
removal order. Before IIRIRA, previous removal orders were 
not reinstated against aliens who re-entered the country. 
Instead, these aliens were placed in the same removal 
proceedings as other aliens who had not previously been 
removed. Reinstatement of a previous removal order was 
reserved for only a subset of individuals. See Fernandez-
Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 33–35 (2006).  
 
 But in IIRIRA, Congress hardened the effect of a 
reinstated removal order. As the Supreme Court noted, in 
enacting this provision Congress “toed a harder line” with 
respect to reinstatement. Id. at 34. The Act broadened the 
applicability of reinstatement, and it “explicitly insulate[d] 
10 
 
the removal orders from review, and generally foreclose[d] 
discretionary relief from the terms of the reinstated order.” Id. 
at 34–35.  
 
 The new reinstatement provision reads: 
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has 
reentered the United States illegally after having been 
removed or having departed voluntarily, under an 
order of removal, the prior order of removal is 
reinstated from its original date and is not subject to 
being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible 
and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, 
and the alien shall be removed under the prior order at 
any time after reentry.  
 
§ 1231(a)(5) (emphasis added).  “[T]his chapter” refers to 
Chapter 12 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code, which contains both 
the asylum statute and the reinstatement bar. 
 
  iii. Attorney General’s Interpretation of the  
  Statutory Scheme 
 
 Three years after Congress enacted IIRIRA, the 
Attorney General promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e),7 
instructing that “[i]f an asylum officer determines that an 
                                              
7  Though the regulation was originally promulgated as 8 
C.F.R. § 208.31(e), it was recodified in 2003 as 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.31(e). Aliens and Nationality; Homeland Security; 
Reorganization of Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 9824 (Feb. 28, 
2003). We use this updated numbering throughout the opinion 
for consistency.  
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alien [subject to a reinstated removal order] has a reasonable 
fear of persecution or torture, the officer shall so inform the 
alien and issue a . . . [r]eferral to [an] Immigration Judge, for 
full consideration of the request for withholding of removal 
only.” (emphasis added). 
 
 The Attorney General clarified that under the 
regulations aliens subject to reinstated removal orders were 
“ineligible for asylum” but “may . . . be entitled to 
withholding of removal” or CAT protection. Regulations 
Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 
8478, 8485 (Feb. 19, 1999). This distinction between 
withholding of removal and asylum for those subject to 
reinstated removal orders “allow[ed] for the fair and 
expeditious resolution of . . . claims without unduly 
disrupting the streamlined removal process applicable to . . . 
aliens [subject to reinstated removal orders].” Id. at 8479.8 In 
brief, the Attorney General determined that the statutory 
scheme forbade aliens subject to reinstated removal orders 
from applying for asylum, but allowed such aliens 
withholding of removal. The BIA relied on this interpretation 




                                              
8  The Attorney General identified § 1158 as one of the 
statutes giving the agency authority to promulgate regulations 




 The issue before us is whether an alien whose removal 
order is reinstated is statutorily ineligible to apply for asylum. 
We must reconcile two apparently conflicting provisions of 
the INA, both enacted on the same day. On the one hand, § 
1158(a)(1) allows “any alien” “irrespective of such alien’s 
status” to apply for asylum. On the other hand, § 1231(a)(5) 
instructs that an alien subject to a reinstated removal order “is 
not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this 
chapter.”  
 
 We are not the first court to consider the effect of a 
reinstated removal order. To date, four Courts of Appeals 
have addressed this question. Each has concluded that 
individuals subject to reinstated removal orders may not 
apply for asylum, though the courts have parted ways in their 
rationales.10 Three of these courts have found the 
                                              
9  We have jurisdiction pursuant to § 1252. The Board’s 
jurisdiction arose under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) & 208.31(e) 
(2014). 
10  Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1082 (9th Cir. 
2016) (statutory scheme was ambiguous and Chevron 
deference was warranted because the Attorney General’s 
interpretation was reasonable); Jiminez-Morales v. U.S. Att’y 
Gen., 821 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016) (plain text of § 
1231(a)(5) supported conclusion that aliens subject to 
reinstated removal orders cannot apply for asylum); Ramirez-
Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g en 
banc denied, 813 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Section 
1231(a)(5)’s plain language, relevant regulations, and 
analogous case law all compel the conclusion that aliens 
13 
 
reinstatement bar clear on its face.11 But these courts 
“mention[] [the asylum provision] only in passing, or not at 
all.”12 Only the Ninth Circuit explicitly considered the 
interplay between the asylum provision and the reinstatement 
bar. Following the analytic path set forth in Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), that Court determined that the statutory scheme was 
ambiguous, and that the Attorney General’s interpretation 
forbidding aliens subject to reinstated removal orders from 
applying for asylum to be reasonable. Perez-Guzman v. 
Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g and 
reh’g en banc denied (9th Cir. 2017). We agree. 
 
 Using the same Chevron framework that the Ninth 
Circuit employed, we first assess whether “Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 842. If we can discern congressional intent using 
the plain text and traditional tools of statutory construction, 
our inquiry ends: we give effect to Congress’s intent. See id. 
at 843. If, however, the statute remains ambiguous, we defer 
to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory 
scheme, even if the interpretation is not what we would 
                                                                                                     
whose removal orders are reinstated may not apply for 
asylum.”); Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 138–39 
(2d Cir. 2010) (plain text, Attorney General’s regulations, and 
precedent all supported conclusion that aliens subject to 
reinstated removal orders could not apply for asylum). 
11 Jiminez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 1310; Ramirez-Mejia, 794 
F.3d at 491; Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 138–39 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
12 Perez-Guzman, 835 F.3d at 1074 (citations omitted). 
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otherwise choose. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). 
  
 A. Chevron Step One   
 In discerning congressional intent, we look first to the 
plain text of the statute. CSX Trans., Inv. v. Ala. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 283 (2011). In this case, the text does 
not indicate clear and unambiguous congressional intent. 
Both provisions at play use broad language to characterize 
their mandates: that “any” alien can apply for asylum, § 
1158(a)(1), but that aliens subject to reinstated removal orders 
are barred from “any relief,” § 1231(a)(5).  “Read naturally, 
the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning . . . .” United States 
v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997). It means “one or some 
indiscriminately of whatever kind.” Id. (quoting Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)). 
 
 But despite use of the word “any,” neither section is as 
broad as it first seems. As to § 1158(a)(1), despite claiming 
that “any” alien may apply for asylum, the section then lists 
specific groups of aliens who may not in fact apply. 
§1158(a)(2)(A)–(C). So, it is not “any” alien who can apply, 
but only certain classes of aliens. As to §1231(a)(5), although 
the section bars “any relief” under the chapter, precedent and 
the Attorney General’s own interpretation clarify that 
withholding from removal and CAT protection—both forms 
of relief13 —are actually still available to individuals in 
                                              
13  Despite both sides’ arguments to the contrary, neither 
statute nor caselaw supports any argument that either asylum 
or withholding of removal is not in fact “relief” in this case. 
See, e.g., Yusupov v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 518 F.3d 
15 
 
reinstatement proceedings. See Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. 
at 35 n.4; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.31(e), 1208.16(c)(4). Here, the 
plain language of the statute offers no insight into Congress’s 
intent as to how we should interpret the interplay between the 
two sections at issue. 
 
 Nor can we discern Congress’s clear intent using 
“traditional tools of statutory construction.” Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 843 n.9. To start, both sides rely on the canon 
generalia specialibus non derogant, that the specific governs 
the general in interpreting a statutory scheme. See Nitro-Lift 
Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2012). The 
logic behind this canon is quite simple: when there are two 
conflicting provisions, we can assume that “Congress has 
enacted a comprehensive scheme and has deliberately 
targeted specific problems with specific solutions.” Radlax 
Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 
2071 (2012) (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 
519 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). Thus, the more specific 
section targets the specific question at issue and that section 
should control our interpretation. 
 
                                                                                                     
185, 188 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008) (referring to withholding of 
removal as “relief”); Ghebrehiwot v. Att’y Gen. of United 
States, 467 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Johnson v. 
Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (referring to 
asylum as relief); see also § 1229(a)(c)(7)(C)(ii) (referring to 
asylum as relief); United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 909 
(defining the “familiar meaning” of “relief” as “any ‘redress 
or benefit’ provided by a court (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1317 (8th ed. 2004)).  
16 
 
 Here, however, the canon does not help us resolve the 
question definitively, because each subsection is more 
specific in certain respects and more general in others. 
Section 1158(a)(1) speaks with specificity as to a type of 
relief Cazun seeks: asylum. But § 1231(a)(5) speaks with 
specificity as to a subset of aliens: those, like Cazun, subject 
to reinstated removal orders. While Judge Hardiman makes 
several persuasive arguments as to why he finds the 
reinstatement bar the more specific provision, Concurrence 
Typescript at 6–9, we are not convinced that this canon 
renders the statutory scheme clear at Chevron’s first step, 
especially given the asylum bar’s explicit applicability to 
aliens “irrespective of [their] status.”14 
                                              
14  Cazun briefly argues that the rule of lenity, or its 
immigration corollary, supports her favored interpretation. 
See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449. But we have never 
found that such a rule of construction clarifies an ambiguous 
statute, especially one with two conflicting provisions, such 
that it does away with the need to proceed to Chevron’s 
second step. Cf. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Cmtys. 
for Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 704 n.18 (1995). Indeed, we 
use the immigration rule of lenity “as a canon of last resort” 
when interpreting statutory ambiguities. Valansi v. Ashcroft, 
278 F.3d 203, 214 n.9 (3d Cir. 2002). “It cannot be the case . . 
. that the doctrine of lenity must be applied whenever there is 
an ambiguity in an immigration statute because, if that were 
true, it would supplant the application of Chevron in the 
immigration context.” Ruiz-Almanzar v. Ridge, 485 F.3d 193, 
198 (2d Cir. 2007). To the contrary, deference is especially 
applicable in the immigration context. See INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999). We also note that the 
policy concerns animating the rule of lenity—executive 
17 
 
 Nor does legislative history clarify Congress’s intent 
on the matter. “IIRIRA’s amendments to the INA show 
Congress intended to add more detail to the existing asylum 
scheme while simultaneously expanding the scope and 
consequences of the reinstatement of an earlier removal 
order.” Perez-Guzman, 835 F.3d at 1076.  Because Congress 
enacted the two conflicting provisions on the same day, 
cherry picking statements from legislative history tends to 
ignore congressional intent on the opposing provision.  
Legislative history is of little use in helping us resolve this 
question.  
 
 Cazun offers a number of other arguments to support 
her position that the statute is clear on its face. None are 
convincing. First, she emphasizes a minor textual change 
Congress made when it recrafted the INA in 1996. The 
original text of the asylum provision had stated that “an” alien 
could apply for asylum irrespective of status; the updated text 
provided that “any” alien could do so. Compare § 1158(a) 
(1980), with id. § 1158(a)(1) (1996). We think this change is 
of little interpretive significance, because on the same day 
that Congress made the change it forbade those subject to 
reinstated removal orders from obtaining “any” relief. 
Certainly this minor alteration does not clearly express 
Congress’s intent on the matter. 
 
 Second, Cazun suggests that making aliens subject to 
reinstated removal orders ineligible for asylum risks running 
afoul of treaty obligations under the United Nations Protocol 
                                                                                                     
encroachment on legislative powers and notice to defendants 
accused of crimes, see Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 
1019, 1023 (6th Cir. 2016)—are not implicated in this case.  
18 
 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”),15 or that 
treaty obligations should at least inform our reading of the 
statute. But, given the availability of withholding of removal 
and CAT protection, there is no treaty obligation in conflict 
with the Government’s reading. See Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 
813 F.3d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 2016) (denying rehearing en 
banc).16   
                                              
15  The United States agreed to comply with the 
substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(“Convention”) in 1968. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 429 
(citing 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6259–6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 
(1968)). The Protocol incorporated the Convention. 
Marincas, 92 F.3d at 197. 
16   Cazun points to three specific Articles from the 
Protocol to support her proposed interpretation. None 
convince us as to Congress’s clear intent. First, she highlights 
Article 34, which urges nations to assimilate refugees. But 
this Article is merely “precatory.” Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. at 441.   
 Second, she turns to Article 28, which requires 
signatories to afford refugees travel documents. She contends 
that the travel restrictions placed on recipients of withholding 
violate this Article, so she must be granted the right to apply 
for asylum. But we have noted that the Protocol is “not self-
executing, nor does it confer any rights beyond those granted 
by implementing domestic legislation.” Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 
404 F.3d 733, 743 (3d Cir. 2005).  And even assuming that 
this Article should influence our interpretation, it does not 
provide the support Cazun contends. Her reasoning that 
withholding of removal “effectively trap[s her] within the 
United States,” Pet. Br. at 33, misstates the relief’s effect. As 
19 
 
 Finally, Cazun argues that our reasoning in Marincas 
v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1996), counsels that we find 
the INA to be clear and unambiguous here. In that case, we 
considered whether the Refugee Act of 1980 required that 
stowaways receive the same asylum proceedings as non-
stowaway aliens. One provision of the INA commanded that 
the Attorney General establish “a procedure”—singular—for 
aliens to apply for asylum “irrespective of [the] alien’s 
status.” § 1158(a) (1980). But an earlier-enacted provision 
instructed that stowaways, a specific class of aliens, were not 
entitled to an exclusion hearing, where the asylum 
determination took place. Marincas, 92 F.3d at 198. Thus, the 
BIA reasoned such stowaway applicants for asylum were not 
entitled to the same adversarial adjudication before an IJ that 
other aliens received at an exclusion hearing. See id. at 199–
200. Instead, the BIA concluded that stowaways applying for 
                                                                                                     
a recipient of withholding of removal and CAT protection, 
Cazun remains free to leave the United States: she simply 
cannot return to the United States without approval from 
immigration authorities. 
 Third, Cazun points to Article 31(1), which forbids 
countries from imposing “penalties” “on account of [an 
applicant’s] illegal entry or presence.” She argues that the 
reinstatement bar constitutes such a penalty. Again, even 
assuming this Article should influence our interpretation, 
neither the text of the Article nor its history clearly indicates 
that the reinstatement bar, which does not imprison or fine 
aliens, is the sort of criminal “penalty” forbidden. See James 
C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International 
Law, 405, 408, 411 (2005). In short, this non-self-executing 
treaty provides no basis for finding that Congress spoke 
clearly on the issue at hand.  
20 
 
asylum should receive only a non-adversarial interview 
before an INS employee. See id. at 199–200. 
 
 We rejected the BIA’s distinction between stowaways 
and other aliens with respect to asylum proceedings. We 
found that, regarding the question we faced there, “the plain 
meaning of the Refugee Act is clear and unambiguous” at the 
first step of Chevron. Id. at 200. Because the statute required 
“a uniform” procedure for an alien to apply for asylum 
“irrespective of such alien’s status,” we found that Congress 
did not intend to allow one procedure for stowaways and 
another for other aliens. See id. at 201. However, we noted 
that stowaways’ hearings could be limited to the issue of 
asylum, and that their hearings need not reach any other 
exclusion issue.  
 
 Cazun likens her case to Marincas: one provision of 
the INA singles out her group—those subject to reinstated 
removal orders—for less favorable immigration procedures 
than other aliens, while another provision envisions equal 
asylum procedures for all aliens.  
 
 Cazun’s analogy fails, however, for several reasons. 
First, as Cazun herself agreed at oral argument, in Marincas 
we considered a different statute altogether than the one we 
analyze today. There, we interpreted the Refugee Act of 
1980, not IIRIRA. Although the language of the asylum 
provision remained largely unchanged by IIRIRA, the 
statutory scheme as a whole shifted dramatically. Therefore, 
Marincas’s interpretation of the asylum provision enacted in 
1980 does little to clarify what Congress intended when it 
enacted IIRIRA, which included the broad reinstatement bar, 




 Second, even setting this difference aside, common 
principles of statutory interpretation distinguish Cazun’s case 
from Marincas. When interpreting statutes, we work to “fit, if 
possible, all parts [of a statute] into an harmonious whole.” 
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 
359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959)). In Marincas, we were able to so 
harmonize the statutory scheme without doing serious 
damage to either of the provisions at issue. For although we 
held that stowaways were entitled to the same adversarial 
hearing as other aliens, we nonetheless reasoned that the 
stowaway’s hearing could be limited to the issue of asylum 
eligibility: consistent with the stowaway provision’s dictates, 
the asylum hearing need not reach any other issue of 
exclusion. Marincas, 91 F.3d at 201. Thus, our ruling 
harmonized the seemingly contradictory provisions, and we 
were able to preserve the “basic thrust” of the stowaway 
provision. Id.  Here, Cazun offers no similar way for us to 
preserve both § 1158(a) and § 1231(a)(5).  
 
 Finally, at the core of our reasoning in Marincas was a 
commitment to discerning congressional intent. We found 
strong support for the idea that “Congress clearly intended a 
single, uniform procedure be established” with respect to 
asylum proceedings. Id. So when we interpreted the weighty 
asylum provision alongside a somewhat cursory, technical 
provision regarding stowaways, it was not difficult to 
conclude that Congress intended that the asylum provision 
should control. But here, we must square the asylum 
provision that affords relief with the reinstatement bar that 
takes such relief away. We know that Congress intended the 
reinstatement bar to be taken seriously, see Fernandez-
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Vargas, 548 U.S. at 33–35, and that the provision should be 
given considerable weight in interpreting the provisions. Thus 
we cannot say, as we did in Marincas, that Congress clearly 
intended that one provision or the other should control. 
Because of these differences, we cannot reconcile the 
provisions so as to find the INA “clear and unambiguous” 
here.17    
 
 The Attorney General’s arguments that the text is clear 
and unambiguous fare no better than Cazun’s. For while the 
Government focuses on language barring aliens from “any 
relief,” it ignores the affirmative asylum provision, which 
applies on its face to “any alien . . . , irrespective of such 
alien’s status.” Accordingly, because the statute does not 
clearly indicate congressional intent, we proceed to the 
second step of Chevron. 
 
 B. Chevron Step Two 
 At the second step of Chevron, we defer to the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute as long as that reading is 
reasonable. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 980.  
Deference to the executive branch is “especially appropriate 
in the immigration context” where officials must make 
complex policy judgments. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 
425; Yosupov, 518 F.3d at 197. We must therefore decide 
whether 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e)—which prevents individuals 
                                              
17  In addition, two other factors supported our analysis in 
Marincas that are not at issue today: a concern for basic due 
process rights once an applicant was entitled to an asylum 
proceeding, 92 F.3d at 203–04, and the Board’s seemingly 
inconsistent statutory interpretations, id. at 201–02.  
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subject to reinstated removal orders from applying for 
asylum—is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory 
scheme.18  
 
 It was reasonable for the agency to conclude that the 
statutory reinstatement bar foreclosing “any relief under this 
chapter” means just what it says: no asylum relief is available 
                                              
18  As a threshold matter, we reject Cazun’s argument that 
the interpretation does not merit Chevron deference because 
the agency did not appreciate the statutory ambiguity at issue. 
She cites out-of-circuit cases for the proposition that an 
agency failing to appreciate statutory ambiguity deserves no 
deference. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier 
Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Cajun Elec. 
Power Coop., Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 924 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 
1991).  
 But even those non-binding cases do not support her 
position. Despite some language in Cajun Electric Power 
Coop., Inc. supporting Cazun’s argument, that case involved 
interpretation of a contract, not a statute. 924 F.3d at 1135. 
And in Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., the agency mistakenly felt 
compelled to reach the conclusion it did. 471 F.3d at 1354; 
see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 521 (2009) 
(refusing to apply Chevron deference where agency 
mistakenly deemed its interpretation “mandated” by 
precedent). Here, Cazun seems to infer from the Attorney 
General’s lack of discussion about the asylum statute that the 
agency felt similarly compelled to arrive at the conclusion it 
did. But this inference is unsubstantiated. On the contrary, the 
agency’s explanation demonstrated that it relied on its own 
expertise to balance Congress’s goals of efficiency and 
fairness in the screening process. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 8485. 
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to those subject to reinstated removal orders. Certainly this 
interpretation was not unreasonable: two Courts of Appeals 
have explicitly adopted the same interpretation without even 
finding the statutory scheme ambiguous. Jiminez-Morales, 
821 F.3d at 1310; Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 489–91.19  
 
 Even independent of these courts’ conclusions, at least 
four factors lend support to the agency’s interpretation. First, 
as discussed at length in Judge Hardiman’s concurrence, the 
reinstatement bar is, at least in some respects, more specific 
than the asylum provision. It applies to a far narrower group 
of aliens—those subject to reinstated removal orders—than 
the asylum provision, which applies to all aliens. From a 
purely textual standpoint, this in and of itself might compel us 
to agree with the Attorney General were we forced to decide 
the issue without resorting to Chevron. 
 
 Second, the Supreme Court has already emphasized 
congressional intent as to IIRIRA in Fernandez-Vargas, 548 
U.S. at 33: Congress meant to strengthen the effect of the 
reinstatement bar. See also H. R. Rep. No. 104-469(I), at 155 
(1996) (“[T]he ability to cross into the United States over and 
over with no consequences undermines the credibility of our 
efforts to secure the border.”). The agency’s interpretation is 
faithful to that intent. For aliens who re-enter our shores 
illegally despite previous removal and instructions not to 
return, the Attorney General’s interpretation takes asylum off 
                                              
19 While the Second Circuit concluded in Herrera-Molina 
that aliens subject to reinstatement removal orders could not 
apply for asylum, that case did not explicitly interpret the 
reinstatement bar. 597 F.3d at 138–39.  
25 
 
the table while allowing other forms of relief that fulfill 
humanitarian commitments.  
 
 Third, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the 
Attorney General can deny asylum in the agency’s discretion 
even when an alien meets the criteria for asylum. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423–24; see also § 1158(d)(5)(B). It 
would be strange to find that granting asylum is discretionary, 
but that the Attorney General must allow Cazun to apply, 
even in the face of contradictory statutory text.  
 
 Finally, the agency has expertise making complex 
policy judgments related to asylum, withholding of removal, 
and CAT protection. Deference regarding questions of 
immigration policy is especially appropriate.  See Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425. 
 
 All this is not to say that the agency’s position is 
flawless. To start, the Attorney General’s interpretation bars 
from asylum those like Cazun whose compelling claims arose 
after their first removal order was issued. This is at least in 
tension with the text of § 1158(a)(2)(D), which allows aliens 
who can demonstrate changed circumstances to apply for 
asylum even when a previous application was rejected.   
 
 Further, the Attorney General’s reading seems 
counterintuitive as applied to someone in Cazun’s situation. 
An alien like Cazun who complies with a removal order is 
barred from asserting an asylum claim on illegal reentry. But 
aliens ordered to be removed who evade deportation are not 
similarly barred: those aliens never left the country, so their 
first removal order remains in effect and is not subject to 
reinstatement. Thus, such non-compliant aliens avoid the 
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reinstatement bar and may apply for asylum in the face of 
changed circumstances, while those who comply with the 
removal order but reenter illegally cannot. 
 
 However, these points are not fatal to the 
Government’s case. For while the Government’s reading 
leaves vulnerable those like Cazun whose claims for asylum 
arose after they were previously removed, as the Government 
urged in briefing and oral argument, reinstatement of a 
removal order is not automatic. See § 1231(a)(5); Perez-
Guzman, 835 F.3d at 1081 (“[T]he government has discretion 
to forgo reinstatement and instead place an individual in 
ordinary removal proceedings.” (citing Villa-Anguiano v. 
Holder, 727 F3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2013))). The agency may 
rely on this flexibility when deciding whether to reinstate a 
previous removal order. Exercising this discretion in cases 
like Cazun’s speaks to the “wisdom of the agency’s policy, 
rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left 
open by Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.20 As a result, 
we will defer to the agency’s expertise on complex matters of 
immigration policy such as the one before us today. See 
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425. 
 
III. Conclusion 
                                              
20  To the extent that prosecutorial discretion is denied to 
aliens such as Cazun, we note that the reinstatement bar 
applies only to “an alien who has reentered the United States 
illegally.” § 1231(a)(5) (emphasis added). Thus, aliens 
subject to removal orders may continue to apply for asylum 
by lawfully approaching a port of entry without illegally 
crossing the border. 
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 In summary, the agency’s interpretation of the 
ambiguous statute is reasonable. When Congress enacted 
IIRIRA, it set the agency adrift between an interpretive Scylla 
and Charybdis. No reading—including Cazun’s—could 
harmonize the statutory scheme perfectly. But because the 
Attorney General’s reading, bolstered by its own expertise, is 




Yoselin Linet Martinez Cazun v. Attorney General United 
States, No. 15-3374 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
 Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), we do not defer to an agency’s 
construction of a statute when “Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. At issue in this 
appeal is whether Yoselin Cazun may apply for asylum even 
though she is the subject of a reinstated removal order. To 
answer that question we must analyze two provisions of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act: 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (the 
“asylum provision”) and § 1231(a)(5) (the “reinstatement 
bar”). The asylum provision permits “[a]ny alien” to apply for 
asylum, while the reinstatement bar precludes aliens subject 
to reinstated removal orders from applying for “any relief.” 
Based on the text, history, and structure of the statute, I would 
hold that the reinstatement bar precludes Cazun from 
applying for asylum. This interpretation fulfills our duty to 
“fit, if possible, all parts [of this statute] into an harmonious 
whole.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (citation omitted). 
Three of our sister courts agree that the INA precludes 
aliens like Cazun from applying for asylum. See Jimenez-
Morales v. Att’y Gen., 821 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(holding an alien with a reinstated removal order “is not 
eligible for and cannot seek asylum”); Ramirez-Mejia v. 
Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding the 
reinstatement bar, “read plainly, broadly denies all forms of 
redress from removal, including asylum”), pet’n for reh’g en 
banc denied, 813 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2016); Herrera-Molina v. 
Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2010) (accepting 
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regulations applying restrictions to aliens subject to 
reinstatement removal orders as correct statutory 
interpretations); see id. at 137 (discussing “the availability of 
suspension of deportation or asylum” and noting “the terms of 
[the reinstatement bar] preclude such relief”). But see Perez-
Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(finding the statute ambiguous and deferring to the Agency). 
And while I agree with the Ninth Circuit in Perez-Guzman 
and with the Majority that the Agency’s interpretation here is 
reasonable, I would join the Eleventh, Fifth, and Second 
Circuits in finding that it is compelled by the statute.  
I 
 The provisions at issue in this appeal were codified in 
1996 as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). IIRIRA recodified the asylum 
provision at § 1158 and enacted for the first time the 
reinstatement bar codified at § 1231(a)(5), which prohibits 
illegal reentrants from applying for “any relief” under the 
statute.  
The asylum provision as recodified in IIRIRA retained 
its original scope and was reformatted in two sections. One 
section provides that “[a]ny alien . . . , irrespective of such 
alien’s status, may apply for asylum” if present in the 
country, and the other section lists some exceptions to the 
general provision. § 1158(a)(1)–(2). 
IIRIRA also implemented a more efficient process for 
the reinstatement of removal orders. Before 1996, those who 
entered the United States illegally after having been deported 
typically were placed in a new round of regular deportation 
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proceedings. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 
33–34 (2006). IIRIRA streamlined the system by reinstating 
prior orders of removal as of their original start date, thus 
hastening the removal process.1 As such, aliens with 
reinstated orders may be removed “at any time after the 
reentry,” without new administrative hearings or any 
opportunity for review. § 1231(a)(5). Most important for 
purposes of this appeal, reinstated orders disqualify those who 
reenter after prior removal from obtaining “any relief under 
this chapter.” Id.  
As the Supreme Court noted, the reinstatement bar 
“toed a harder line” by “appl[ying] to all illegal reentrants.” 
Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 34–35 (emphasis added). This 
“harder line,” id. at 34, punishes and deters the criminal act of 
reentering the country illegally, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326. See 
generally In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 370–71 (B.I.A. 
2007) (“[O]ne of the chief purposes of the IIRIRA . . . was to 
overcome the problem of recidivist immigration violations by 
[inter alia] escalating the punitive consequences . . . of illegal 
reentry.” (citing IIRIRA §§ 105(a)(2), 301(b)(1), 303(a), 
305(a)(3), (b)(3), 324(a), 326, 332, 353(b), which “expedite 
the detection, deterrence, and punishment of recidivist 
immigration violators”)). 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service 
implemented the reinstatement bar by promulgating 
regulations that established expedited removal proceedings 
for illegal reentrants subject to a prior removal order, 8 C.F.R. 
                                              
 1 IIRIRA also consolidated deportation and exclusion 
proceedings into one “removal” proceeding. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227. The reinstatement provision further streamlines this 
removal process for aliens with reinstated removal orders. 
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§ 241.8(a), (c), and precluded those aliens from filing asylum 
applications, id. § 208.31(e) (allowing reasonable fear 
proceedings “for full consideration of the request for 
withholding of removal only” (emphasis added)). 
II 
At Chevron Step One, we use “traditional tools of 
statutory construction” to ascertain whether “Congress had an 
intention on the precise question.” Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 
F.3d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In doing so, 
we “consider the text and structure of the statute in question.” 
United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2008). 
Cazun and the Government agree that the statute is 
clear, but they disagree about whose position it supports. 
Cazun claims she should prevail because the asylum 
provision states that “[a]ny alien” may apply for asylum, 
“irrespective of such alien’s status.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). 
For its part, the Government argues that Cazun is ineligible 
for asylum because she is subject to a reinstated removal 
order and the reinstatement bar says she is “not eligible and 
may not apply for any relief” under Chapter 12 of Title 8 of 
the United States Code, which includes the asylum provision. 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). 
We previously found both sections at issue to be clear 
when read independently. We held in Marincas v. Lewis that 
“under the plain meaning of [the asylum provision], Congress 
clearly and unambiguously intended that the Attorney 
General establish a uniform asylum procedure that is to be 
applied irrespective of an alien’s status.” 92 F.3d 195, 201 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (disallowing unequal procedures for alien 
stowaways). Marincas does not control this appeal, however. 
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As my colleagues note, Maj. Op. at 19–21, Marincas did not 
analyze the reinstatement bar because it had not yet taken 
effect. After our decision in Marincas, in a case dealing with 
the reinstatement bar, we assumed in dicta that “asylum is not 
available to aliens who face reinstatement of a prior order of 
removal [under] 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).” Gonzalez-Posadas v. 
Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 680 (3d Cir. 2015). Because neither 
Marincas nor Gonzalez-Posadas analyzed the interplay 
between the asylum provision and the reinstatement bar, this 
appeal requires us for the first time to “attempt to harmonize” 
two statutory provisions that seem, at first blush, to conflict 
with one another. N.J. Air Nat’l Guard v. Fed. Labor 
Relations Auth., 677 F.2d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 1982); see also 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“The courts 
are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional 
enactments, and . . . it is the duty of courts, absent a clearly 
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard 
each as effective.”). 
A 
 Our effort to harmonize these provisions begins with 
the text of the statute. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 283 (2011). As the Majority notes, 
both provisions use the word “any,” which typically has an 
“expansive meaning.” Maj. Op. at 14 (citing United States v. 
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)). Yet “neither section is as 
broad as it first seems.” Id.  
After stating that any alien, irrespective of status, may 
apply for asylum, the asylum provision then lists several 
exceptions preventing certain aliens from doing so in specific 
circumstances. See § 1158(a)(2). It is thus clear that some 
aliens may not apply for asylum. In a similar way, after the 
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reinstatement bar states that aliens with reinstated removal 
orders may not apply for any relief, the statute goes on to 
allow them to seek withholding of removal to certain 
countries. See § 1231(b)(3)(A). Thus, that section does not 
bar all types of relief. So neither provision is absolute, and 
both may be limited by other provisions. Therefore, we must 
turn to canons of construction and the statute’s structure to 
see whether the two provisions can be harmonized. 
B 
Cazun and the Government both invoke the 
“specificity” canon of statutory construction. Maj. Op. at 15. 
Simply put, this means that a “narrow, precise, and specific” 
statutory provision is not overridden by another provision 
“covering a more generalized spectrum.” Radzanower v. 
Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976); see also 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012) (explaining that 
because the more specific text “comes closer to addressing 
the very problem posed by the case at hand[, it] is thus more 
deserving of credence”).  
 Instead of challenging this canon of construction, the 
parties each claim that their favored provision is more 
specific than the other one. Although both parties provide 
reasonable arguments,2 I am convinced that the reinstatement 
                                              
 2 Justice Scalia and Mr. Garner recognize that in some 
cases, “it is difficult to determine whether a provision is a 
general or specific one.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 187. 
Sometimes two provisions may be seen as more specific each 
in their own way. See id. at 187–88 (citing Radzanower, 426 
U.S. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
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bar is more specific than the asylum provision. While the 
asylum provision establishes general rules for asylum 
applications, the reinstatement bar deals specifically with a 
particular subset of illegal aliens: those who are subject to 
reinstated removal orders. As such, it is most naturally read as 
an exception to the “general permission,” Scalia & Garner, 
supra, at 183, to apply for asylum. By making relief 
unavailable to certain aliens, the reinstatement bar nullifies 
every relief provision to which it applies with respect to 
certain persons no longer eligible for that relief.  
 Cazun argues that the reinstatement bar is a “blunt 
instrument” that is less detailed, and thus less specific, than 
the asylum provision. Cazun Br. 17–18. I disagree. The 
reinstatement bar’s application to all of Chapter 12 does not 
defeat its specificity. When Congress raised the age at which 
Americans could receive full Social Security benefits, see 
Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 
§ 201, 97 Stat. 65 (1983) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1)), 
the law affected millions of people. But its broad applicability 
did nothing to dilute its specificity. In a similar way, the 
reinstatement bar applies to a large but specific group of 
people (aliens with reinstated removal orders) and deprives 
them of relief for which they would otherwise qualify—in 
this case, asylum.   
 As the Majority suggests, the asylum provision can 
also be seen as specific insofar as it deals with just one of 
many types of relief. Maj. Op. at 16; see also Perez-Guzman, 
835 F.3d at 1075–76. But focusing the specificity inquiry on 
the type of relief available as opposed to the type of person 
affected creates tensions in the statute that my interpretation 
does not.  
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 First, the reinstatement bar creates an exception from 
the general availability of multiple forms of relief (of which 
asylum is one), whereas the asylum provision simply 
establishes rules for asylum applications and makes them 
generally available to “[a]ny alien,” subject to exceptions. If 
asylum (and every other form of relief) were deemed more 
specific than the reinstatement bar, all forms of relief found in 
Chapter 12 would be unaffected by the reinstatement bar, 
essentially nullifying that section in violation of another 
canon of construction: “the cardinal principle that we do not 
cripple statutes by rendering words therein superfluous.” 
Rojas v. Att’y Gen., 728 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2013); see 
also id. at 210 (“It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to 
every clause and word of a statute.” (quoting Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))). 
 Second, creating a requirement that all forms of relief 
in Chapter 12 must cross-reference the reinstatement bar in 
order for it to apply, as Cazun recommends, would run afoul 
of the statutory scheme. Cazun claims that because the 
asylum provision enumerates some exceptions, see 
§ 1158(a)(2), (b)(2)(A), but does not reference the 
reinstatement bar among them, Congress did not intend to 
make illegal reentrants ineligible for asylum. But if the 
reinstatement bar applied only to types of relief that cross-
referenced it, it would never apply. See Gov’t Br. 29 (noting 
that none of the forms of relief under the INA specifically 
refers to reinstatement of removal). Such an interpretation not 
only would render the reinstatement bar superfluous, it would 
also contravene the Supreme Court’s observation that the 
reinstatement bar “generally forecloses discretionary relief 
from the terms of the reinstated [removal] order,” Fernandez-
Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35.  
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 Indeed, the Supreme Court already recognized that 
Congress limited at least some types of relief via the 
reinstatement bar when it “held that aliens subject to 
reinstatement orders are ineligible for adjustments of status[] . 
. . [even though] the adjustment-of-status provision[ did] not 
mention reinstatement orders.” Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 
490 (describing Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 46–47, and 8 
U.S.C. § 1255 (adjustment-of-status provision)). It so held 
despite the fact that the adjustment-of-status provision—like 
the asylum provision—does not reference the reinstatement 
bar among its other enumerated exceptions. Provisions like 
the reinstatement bar, which by their terms create exceptions 
from many other sections, need not list every section to which 
they apply, nor must they be explicitly cross-referenced in the 
excepted provisions. Congress may choose to limit one 
section of a statute via another section without an explicit 
cross-reference to or amendment of the section to be limited. 
See id. (“The judiciary’s role is not to question the method of 
an amendment but only to interpret its effect.”). 
C 
 Cazun’s remaining counterarguments are also 
unavailing.  
 The reinstatement bar speaks to the more specific 
problem Congress meant to address even if Cazun is correct 
that in some years those who are subject to reinstatement 
removal orders outnumber those who apply for asylum. As 
with the Social Security example mentioned previously, the 
numerosity of the class sheds no light on the specificity of the 
statute. Moreover, not every alien who submits an asylum 
application is subject to a reinstated removal order, which is 
reflected by every successful asylum applicant since 1996. 
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Thus, there are necessarily fewer asylum applications from 
aliens with reinstated orders than the total number of asylum 
applications. The class of aliens who seek asylum despite 
reinstated removal orders, then, is still narrower than the class 
of aliens who seek asylum generally.  
 The policy concerns created by Cazun’s changed 
circumstances should not sway our opinion either. Congress 
decided to “toe[] a harder line” with respect to “illegal 
reentrants,” Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 34–35, and to 
discourage initial illegal entry by removing some options 
upon illegal reentry. And the fact that withholding of removal 
is available to Cazun and those like her mitigates somewhat 
the concerns about “dire humanitarian consequences,” Perez-
Guzman, 835 F.3d at 1081. And as my colleagues note, 
asylum seekers may declare themselves at the border without 
illegally reentering the country after they have been removed. 
See Maj. Op. at 26 n.20.  
 Congress’s focus on illegal reentry would also explain 
the disparate treatment of aliens successfully removed 
previously (even if changed circumstances result) from those 
who have not yet been removed. See Maj. Op. at 25–26. It is 
only the former group that commits the action which triggers 
reinstated removal orders: “reenter[ing] the United States 
illegally after having been removed or having departed 
voluntarily.” § 1231(a)(5). 
III 
 Because the statute is not “silent or ambiguous” as to 
whether aliens with reinstatement orders of removal may 
apply for asylum, I would enforce the statute as written rather 
than defer to the Agency’s interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S. 
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at 843. Section 1231(a)(5)—the reinstatement bar—
specifically prevents the subclass of aliens of which Cazun is 
a member from applying for any relief under Chapter 12 of 
Title 8, which includes asylum. Nothing about this section is 
ambiguous, nor is there an implication that Congress intended 
a “legislative delegation to [the Agency] on [the] particular 
question” of the effect of reinstated removal orders. Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 844. Unlike the “definitional issue” in Chevron, 
id. at 858, in which the lack of definition of “stationary 
source” meant that “Congress did not actually have an intent 
regarding the applicability of [the relevant environmental] 
concept to the permit program,” id. at 845, Congress here has 
expressed its intent to disqualify illegal reentrants from 
applying for asylum, among other forms of relief.  
The Majority opinion eloquently describes the facts, 
the question of statutory interpretation presented, and the 
various legal arguments made by both sides. I agree with my 
colleagues that the Agency’s interpretation of IIRIRA is 
reasonable, and would join them in full if I believed this 
question should be decided under Step Two of Chevron. I 
concur only in the judgment, however, because I think we 
should end our analysis at Step One. 
 It is true that the apparent conflict in this case presents 
a difficult question of statutory interpretation, but our 
traditional tools of statutory construction answer it. Unless we 
find silence or ambiguity after employing these tools, we 
must answer even difficult interpretative questions. See 
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2214 (2014) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment) (“[D]eference is [not] 
warranted because of a direct conflict between [two] clauses . 
. . . [Statutory] conflict is not ambiguity . . . .”). The 
reinstatement bar singles out a subclass of aliens—illegal 
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reentrants subject to reinstated removal orders—and deprives 
them of various forms of relief available under Chapter 12, 
including asylum.  
 More than merely reasonable, the Agency’s view that 
Cazun is ineligible for asylum is compelled by the statute. For 
that reason, I concur in the judgment. 
